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In this paper, we investigate the nature of asymmetry in the influence of oil price changes on 
output in six MENA countries. To get more observations for our analysis, we proxy GDP 
with industrial output and hence our inference is based on a relatively larger sample 
compared to previous studies. The results that we obtain are interesting and intuitive. First, 
we find that growth in MENA countries is linked to oil in the sense that it benefits from 
higher oil prices and it gets hurt by a fall in the oil market. Moreover, there are pronounced 
short- and long-term asymmetries in the influence of oil on output. In particular, the output is 
faster to respond to increases in the oil price than it responds to decreases. The long-term 
influence to a rise in oil is also higher, though it is realized over a longer period. These results 
are important and can be used to guide policies that are concerned with stabilizing the 
economies of the MENA region against oil price fluctuations.1     
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In the literature, there is extensive evidence that in oil importer countries, rises in the price 
of oil trigger economic recessions, while its fall is unlikely to start a comparable economic 
expansions.2 These asymmetries in the response of output to the change in the price of oil are 
surprising as the purchasing power of oil importers rises and falls by the same amount after 
similar positive and negative changes in the price of oil.3 Therefore, one would expect the  
response of output to the same exogenous negative and positive oil shocks to be asymmetric 
in the oil importing as well as the oil exporting countries. 
Many explanations have been provided in the literature.4 For instance, Hamilton (1988) 
attributed asymmetry to the reallocation effects that accompany the changes in the relative 
prices with respect to oil. A shock to oil disturbs the relative values and it leads to 
reallocation of resources which is costly for the economy. In an oil importer economy, this 
exacerbates the bad influence of an increase in the oil price and it reduces the positive impact 
following its decline. Another explanation of asymmetry is provided by Bernanke (1983) 
who has explained it by the increase in uncertainty following oil price changes.5 Edelstein 
and Kilian (2009) explained the asymmetry in the context of the employment uncertainty and 
the increases in the precautionary savings after an unexpected change in the price of oil. In 
both Bernanke (1983) and Edelstein and Kilian (2009) uncertainty tends to lessen expansions 
after oil declines and to worsen recessions after oil market rallies.  
                                                          
2
 See for instance, Bernanke et al. (1997); Hamilton (1988), Balke, Brown and Yücel (2002), Edlestein and 
Kilian (2009), Kilian and Vigfusson (2009), Elder and Serletis (2010), Kilian & Vigfusson (2011a,b, 2013), 
Herrera, et al. (2011, 2015), Baumeister and Kilian (2016), Baumeister et al. (2018), and Baumeister and
Hamilton (2019) among many others.   
3
 Note that with the increase in the oil price, resources are transferred from oil importing countries to oil 
exporting countries. Hence, the purchasing power decreases and increases for oil importers and exporters 
respectively. 
4
 Herrera et al. (2019) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature.  




In the literature, the analysis of asymmetry focuses on net oil importing countries and 
there is little evidence on whether the response of output to oil shocks is asymmetric in oil 
exporting regions. Hence, it is interesting to investigate asymmetries in oil exporters and 
whether it can be explained by reallocation effects, uncertainty effects and monetary policy 
effects. The only difference is that in oil abundant regions, oil is expected to be positively 
related to output and hence, oil price declines are likely to trigger recessions whereas its 
increases are expected to be expansionary. 
The literature on how oil price changes influence GDP in the context of MENA countries 
is still underdeveloped.6 However, there is a group of studies which found that the negative 
influence of oil price falls is more pronounced than the positive influence of its rises. This 
surprising result is explained by the increase in the rent-seeking behavior, poor policies and 
reallocation effects that accompany the rise in oil. Moreover, the rise in the oil price increases 
government investment spending and this crowd out private capital and investments with 
negative repercussions on economic growth.  
Therefore, in this paper, we contribute to the current literature by focusing on asymmetry 
in oil exporting rather than in oil importing countries as it is customary in the literature. 7 The 
aim is to give a new evidence and to provide some theoretical discussion as to why 
asymmetric responses of output may also occur in oil exporters. For that purpose, we look 
into a sample of six countries in the MENA region. These countries are: Saudi Arabia, UAE, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt and Tunis. The first four of these countries are net oil exporters and 
hence our sample fits for our purpose. It is widely believed that the MENA region is an oil 
region and that higher oil prices are good for its trade, investment, and economic growth. 
                                                          
6
 Most studies on oil in the MENA region focus on therelationship between oil and equities. See for insta ce, 
Maghyereh, and AlKandari (2007); Arouri and Rault (2010); Akoum et al. (2012); Awartani and Maghyereh 
(2013); Jouini and Harrathi (2014); Maghyereh and Awartani (2016); Awartani et al. (2018); Maghyereh et al. 
(2018, 2019).   
7
 Only Nusair (2016) focuses on asymmetry in the MENA region. The rest of the literature is only concerned 




Hence, studying asymmetry to oil price changes in th s region is indicative of the extent of 
the reallocation, the uncertainty and the monetary policy effects that accompany the changes 
in the oil price.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 a synopsis of the literature on 
the oil-output nexus is provided. Section 3 discusses the methodology we employed. The data 
set and its characteristics will be provided in section 4. In Section 5, we present the empirical 
findings.  Section 6 checks the robustness of results under a different data generating process. 
Finally, we provide our conclusion in Section 7.  
2. Literature Review 
A particular feature that is substantiated in the academic literature of oil importers is the 
distinctive reaction of economic growth to negative and positive oil price shocks. A 
phenomenon that is termed in the literature as asymmetry (See, Hamilton, 1988; Bernanke, 
1983; Lardic and Mignon, 2008). Specifically, it is found that while oil price increases may 
cause the economy to slow down, similar decreases in the oil price do not trigger economic 
acceleration.   
In oil exporter countries, there are many studies that focus on the relationship between oil 
and output. However, few of these has been concerned with investigating and explaining 
asymmetry in the response of output to oil price shocks.8 The same applies to the oil—output 
studies in the MENA region.   
For instance, the studies by Mehrara (2008) and Moshiri and Banijashem (2012) find that 
while output growth is negatively affected by a fall in the oil market, its response to rise is 
weak and negligible. Cologni and Manera (2013) used  error correction model analysis to 
show that oil and output are cointegrated in oil abundant countries. The study by Esfahani et 
al. (2014) find a long-term relationship between the real oil price and the real output in eight 
                                                          
8
 Allegret et al. (2014), Korhonen and Juurikkala (2009), Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009), El Anshasy and 
Bradley (2012), Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016, 2017), and Maghyereh et al. (2020). 
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major oil exporter countries around the globe. Nusair (2016) has also found strong 
interlinkages between oil and output in the GCC countries.9 Recently, Mohaddes and Raissi 
(2016) have studied the impact of low oil prices on country economic growth globally by 
using the GVAR model. Their results indicate that the economies of MENA oil exporters 
have slowed by approximately 1.32% following the drop in the oil price that resulted from 
the start of shale oil production in the US.10 
The results of the studies on the oil-output nexus in the MENA countries suffer from the 
small sample size bias. The parameter estimates of the impact and their standard errors may 
be inaccurate and it suffers from parameter estimation errors despite their consistency. For 
instance, Mehrara’s (2008) sample is 40 observations, Moshiri and Banijashem’s (2012) 
sample is 31 observations, Cologni and Manera’s (2013) sample is 51 observations and 
Nusair’s (2016) sample is 30 observations.   
In this paper, we overcome these problems of data limitations by using the industrial 
output to proxy real GDP. The industrial output is available at the monthly frequency and it 
may not deviate from the state of the economy for a long period of time and hence, it is 
closely related to real output particularly in the longer term. Thus, our sample does not suffer 
from the small sample bias as it contains more observations.  In addition, for the purpose of 
comparison, we include Egypt and Tunis and we have provided a full account and 
explanation of our findings. In our analysis, we also focus on the period that followed the 
global financial crisis and our samples extend from 2006 to 2018 depending on the country. 
Finally, our focus is on asymmetry and we provide a complete account for this issue.  
3. Methodology 
                                                          
9
 The GCC is an economic block of oil producing countries that include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab 
Emirates, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar.     
10
 Many cross-countries studies investigate the relationship between oil prices and economic growth. For 
instance, Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016, 2017); Berument et al. (2010); Baumeister et al. (2010); Peersman and 
Van Robays (2012); Vespignani (2015); Verspignani and Ratti (2016); and Maghyereh et al. (2019).  
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The asymmetric bound-testing approach in the context of NARDL which is developed by 
Shin et al. (2014) is used in the current study to test for asymmetry. The NARDL framework 
utilizes negative and positive partial sum decompositions of the independent variables and 
this enables us to easily detect asymmetric interacions between the variables in the short- and 
the long-run. The bounds testing in the NARDL requires the variables to be integrated of 
order 0 or 1. The integration order of variables and its stationarity are checked by the 
Lagrange Multiplier unit root test of Lee and Strazicich (2003). The test allows for structural 
break and non-linearity in the data. In this section, we briefly describe NARDL model and 
the LM unit root test.  
 
3.1 NARDL framework 
 Suppose that  ,  ,   and  are the real industrial production, the real oil prices, 
the inflation rate and real lending rate in a particular MENA country.11 Following Shin et al. 
(2014), a simple asymmetric long run relationship between oil and output can be written as  
 = 	

 + 	 +  +  + 																																	(1) 
																				∆ =  																																																																																																									(2) 
 In this specification, the variable are assumed to have one cointegrating relationship. 
Instead of having the long run relationship with the level of the oil price , it is modelled 
with the partial sums of the negative  and the positive 
 oil price processes,  =
 +  + 
. These partial sums are computed as 





=  max∆, 0" ;


 =  ∆






  If the |	
| ≠ |	| in equation 1, then similar increases and decreases in the oil price will 
not have the same impact on output. The MENA output is not expected to drive the oil price 
and hence, we do not expect an endogeneity problem, but the model in 1 lacks the short term 
                                                          
11
 All quantities are denominated in the domestic currency of the relevant country.  
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dynamics. Hence, the nonlinear dynamic autoregressiv  distributed lag model (NARDL) of 
Shin et al. (2014) is more suitable as it accounts for asymmetry, the long and the short-term 
dynamics.  
The non-linear	()*(+, ,, -, .) can be written as 
 =  ∅ + 0
1












where   is defined as  +  + 
, and ∅ ’s are the autoregressive parameters that 
capture the own dynamics of the growth process. The0
and 0 are the asymmetric 
distributed lag parameters that measure the influence of positive and negative partial sums of 
the oil prices 
and on the industrial output. In Eq. 3, 7 is assumed to follow an ;;< 
process with zero mean and constant variance, =>.      
The relationship in 3 can be re-written as:12 
∆ = ? +  +  + 0
@

















where ? = ∑ ∅ − 1: ,  = − ∑ ∅3:3
  for F = 1, … . , + − 1, 0
 = ∑ 0
9 , 0 =
∑ 0, A
 = 0
, A = − ∑ 093
9 		for F = 1, … . , , − 1.  
Note that Eq. 4 is actually an error correction formulation of the relationship between oil 
and industrial production which may be written as 
















                                                          
12
 It is straightforward to get Eq. 4 from Eq. 3 following Pesaran et al. (2001).   
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where the cointegrating vector is written as  IJK =  − 	
@
 − 	@ − 1 −
1  . The parameters 	
 = M
N
O  and 	 =
MP
O   are the corresponding long-term 
parameters.13 By including an appropriate lag structure in 8, wemay free the model from 
potential serial correlations in the residuals. 
Note that when ? in 5 is zero, there is no cointegration between oil and output. This 
implies that the oil price changes have no influence on output in the long term. An F test for 
the null of ? = 0
1 = 01 = 0 has been proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) and we will r fer 
to this test as QRR test.  A value of the computed test statistics that lies beyond these bounds 
implies that oil and output are not cointegrated an value between these bounds implies 
inconclusiveness.            
Another nonstandard test for the long term cointegration has been also proposed by 
Banerjee et al. (1998) who suggest testing the null of ? = 0 against ? < 0 in 5, we denote 
this test as the TUVW test. Both of these tests will be used to infer cointegration between oil 
price changes and output. Finally, we test for long- and short-term asymmetry using a 
standard Wald test of the relevant parameters.14   
  The specification in Eq. 5 is appropriate for ourp pose as it is able to capture, the short-
term and the long-term dynamics and asymmetry in the relationship between the oil price and 
industrial output. As the model is linear in terms of all of its parameters, it can be estimated 
by a standard OLS estimator. 
3.2 LM unit root test  
The ADF unit root test has low power if there are nonlinearities or structural breaks (See, 
Perron, 1989; Nazlioglu, 2011). To improve the power of the unit root test, we further depend 
                                                          
13
 The bias in case of endogeneity can be easily correted by using instrumental variables.    
14 The null for the long-term asymmetry test is 	
 = 	 and for the short-term asymmetry is  ∑ A
19X =
∑ A19Y .  
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on the Lee and Strazicich (2003) LM unit root test. This test allows for the endogenous 
determination of the size and the time of structural b eaks both in the level and in the trend of 
the data generating process.  
Consider the following data generating process: 
Z = 21[ + 7,					7 = 	7 +  ,									~;;<(0, =)																			(6) 
 
where [, is a vector of exogenous variables that define the data generating process. The test 
for unit roots is based on the parameter 	 and the null hypothesis is 	 = 1. To accommodate  
a structural break in the intercept and a change in the slope of the trend, the vector of 
exogenous variables [ is specified as [ = ^1, T, ), )K_1, where )K = T − KU  for T > KU +
1, and zero otherwise. The KU	 here denotes the time period when the break occurs. To 
endogenously determine the location of the break, the LM unit-root procedure searches all 
possible break points with minimum unit-root t-test statistic in order to find the greatest lower 
bound such that:15 
*ab = cd	ẽgh" = cdieg, where	g = KU K⁄ 																																		(7) 
  
4. Data Set  
 We obtain monthly data on the WTI crude oil prices, the industrial production, the 
lending rate and the inflation rate from Thomson Reuters Datastream. A complete data set is 
found for six MENA countries. These countries are Egypt, Tunis, the United Arab Emirates, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar.16 
We find data for Egypt from November 2010 to June 2018 for a total of 89 monthly 
observations. The data for Saudi Arabia starts in December 2006, but it ends in October 2018 
and hence, we have found 119 monthly observations. The rest of the samples are as follows: 
the UAE data is available from January 2008 to October 2016, for a total of 105 observations; 
                                                          
15 The critical values of the LM unit root test statistics are tabulated in Lee and Strazicich (2003). 
16
   A full data set for the rest of other MENA countries are not available on a monthly basis.   
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The Kuwaiti data from July 2009 to October 2016 fora total of 88 observations; The 
Tunisian data from October 2007 to March 2018 for a tot l of 125 observations; and finally, 
the Qatari data from January 2009 to October 2016 for a total of 96 observations. 
The monthly consumer price index and the monthly foreign exchange rate against the 
dollar are used in order to get real output and real oil prices denominated in the domestic 
currency of the relevant country. The lending rate above the inflation is used in order to get 
the real rate.  
Figure 1 displays how the real industrial output changes with real oil prices. The stacked 
diagrams show that the industrial output of the MENA economies expands with the increase 
in the price of oil and shrinks with its decrease. This pattern of the relationship is uniform 
across countries and it is more pronounced during large draw ups and large drawdowns in the 
real price of oil.17  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the log real oil price, industrial production, inflation 
and the real lending rate of the countries in the sample. The table shows that the real oil price 
is negatively skewed and its kurtosis is slightly above the kurtosis of a normal. The Jarque-
Bera statistics reject the normality of the oil price at conventional levels. Industrial 
production does not have a consistent pattern across c untries. It is positively skewed in 
Egypt, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia, but it is negatively skewed in the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait.      
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 Table 2 displays the Augmented Dicky Fuller Test of unit roots in the levels, the first 
differences and the second differences of the variables. The null hypothesis is not rejected for 
the level of output and oil but it is strongly reject d at the 1% level for the first differences. 
The real lending rates and the inflation rates are stationary. Surprisingly, the first difference 
                                                          
17 It is well known that the MENA region depends on oil. The rise in oil benefits economic growth in the region 
through cross country foreign direct investment, trade and employment.   
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of the Kuwaiti and Saudi industrial output are covariance non-stationary, but the second 
differences are found to be stationary.   
 [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
The results Lee and Strazicich unit root test with one endogenous structural break are 
presented are all reported in Table 3. The t-statistics associated with the LM test presented in 
Column 2 shows that all variables are non-stationary, but their first difference is stationary at 
the 1% significance level.18  
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 report the dates of structu al breaks as determined 
econometrically by the procedure. As can be seen in the table, the breaking dates of the levels 
and the differences of the variables are different across countries. Columns 6 and 7 display 
the test results when breaks exists in the level of the data generating process. Similarly, the 
test results for breaks in the trend of the data are presented in Columns 8 and 9. As can be 
seen in all columns the null of unit root is uniformly rejected across countries at the 5% 
significance level.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
In the NARDL model in 5, we regress output on the cumulative negative and positive 
changes of the oil price. Hence, for a valid inference, it would be necessary to test for unit 
roots in the negative and positive partial sum processes of the oil price.19 These tests are 
presented in Table 1A in Appendix A, and it shows stationary positive and negative partial 
sums in oil price changes which implies non stationarity at the level of these variables as 
assumed by the NARDL model.  
The BDS test of Brock et al. (1996) shows pronounced nonlinearity in all series, thus 
providing further justification for the NARDL non-linear functional form.20  
                                                          
18
 In the NARDL model variables are assumed to be integrat d of order 1. As our variables are I(1), we may 
safely proceed to estimate and infer the oil-output relationship from the model.      
19
 This point has been brought to our attention thankfully by one of the referees.   
20  To save on space, these results are not reported bu  available from the authors upon request.   
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5. Empirical Findings 
5.1  Preliminary analysis 
Table 4 presents the non-parametric Granger causality test of Bekiros and Diks (2008). 
The table shows that the influence of the changes in the price of oil is significant at the 5% 
level in all sample countries.   
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
The only information you get from this classical Granger causality test is whether the oil 
price changes impact the future economic growth or not, but it does not reveal any potential 
asymmetries in the causal relationship between the variables.21 A particular test that is 
different and revealing is the Hatemi-J (2012) testwhich is based on the cumulative negative 
and positive sums of the changes in the oil price and the industrial output processes. Figure 2 
displays the cumulative negative and positive sums of oil and output.  
 
 [INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
In the Hatemi-J (2012) test, the positive and the negative processes of the real output and 
the oil price are modelled as VAR-SUR processes in which the previous positive and 
negative output and oil influence the future positive and negative changes in output and oil. 
Thus, the model allows for a Wald test of asymmetric causality in the usual form. The test 
may run over from  
	to 
 or over any other combination. However, as the output and 
the oil price are not normal, the Chi-squared critical values of the Wald test statistics may be 
biased. Therefore, we follow Hatemi-J (2012) and employ a bootstrap algorithm with 
leverage corrections in order to get accurate critical values.22 
                                                          
21
 The unsuitability of standard causality tests for checking causal asymmetric relationships has been thankfully 
pointed to us by one of the referees.     
22
 The technical details of this test can be found in Hatemi-J (2012), Hatemi-J, A. (2014) and Hatemi-J, A. and 
El-Khatib Y. (2016).  
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Table 5 presents the test results.23 As expected an increase in the oil price leads to more 
growth in all sample countries except Tunis where gowth slows down. Tunis is a net 
importer of oil and this explains the negative effect of a hike in the prices of energy on its 
small economy.24 The economies of oil exporters expand and contract after increases and 
decreases in the price of oil. However, increases in oil hurt the output and the production of 
net oil importer economies by more than these economies are benefiting from energy price 
decreases.25  The test also shows that the influence of a decrease in the oil price is more 
significant than the impact of an increase except for Kuwait. This indicates that oil price 
increases are less likely to benefit growth but oil price decreases are highly likely to slow the 
economy in the sample countries.     
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
5.2 Main results 
Now, we proceed to estimate the NARDL as in Eq. 5. Table 6 presents the estimation 
results. The table shows that the model fits the data well. The diagnostics of the errors 
indicate no serial correlation, no heteroskedasticity and suitable functional form.26 Table 6 
shows that the real industrial output and the real oil price are cointegrated in Saudi Arabia, 
the UAE, and Tunisia. The TUVW test statistics rejects the null of no cointegration at the 5% 
significance level.27 The same result is inferred from the QRR bounds test. The two countries 
that are found with weak cointegration evidence are Egypt and Kuwait. 
                                                          
23 We use GAUSS codes to run the test. The authors are grateful to A. Hatemi-J for providing the codes 
necessary to conduct this analysis. 
24 Tunis produces some oil from El Borma and Ashtart fields, but it imports large proportions of its oil needs 
from Libya. 
25 Similar results from the recent literature on the positive impact of oil increases on oil exporter countries can 
be found in Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009), Korhonen and Juurikkala (2009), El Anshasy and Bradely 
(2012), Allegret et al. (2014), and Nusair (2016). 
26 The lags of the partial sums of oil and output are chosen using the AIC information criteria which is checked 
up to a max p = max q = 12. Then all insignificant stationary regressors are dropped from the model. 
27
 As mentioned previously here we test the null of ? = 0 against the alternative of < 0 . The parameter ? is the 
adjustment speed parameter that is associated with the error correction term in the non-linear ARDL model.    
14 
 
The estimated long-term non-linear relationship has similar characteristics across 
countries. Output increases and decreases with the incr ases and the decreases in the oil price. 
However, the output is more sensitive to oil price rallies than to oil price falls. The Table 6 
shows that the estimated long -term response of industrial production to a 1% increase in the 
partial sum of positive changes in the real oil price is 0.40%, -0.38%, 0.42%, 0.40%, 0.32%, 
0.17% for Egypt, Tunisia, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar respectively. This can be 
compared with an output response of -0.15%, 0.09%, -0.07%, -0.24%, -0.21%, -0.14% and -
0.10% that result from a decrease in the oil price of the same countries respectively.   
 There is a contemporaneous influence of oil on the real output of net exporters of the 
MENA region. The influence is significant during increases as well as decreases in the real 
price of oil. Occasionally, the partial sums of the previous changes in the oil price do 
influence current real industrial production. For instance, oil price positive and negative 
changes at two lags seem to be significant in Saudi Arabia. Similarly, negative changes in 
partial sums of the real oil price at four lags negatively influence the industrial production of 
Kuwait and positively influence the industrial production of Tunisia. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
The influence of control variables is found to be in line with the related literature. The 
changes in the inflation rate influence positively the industrial production of all MENA 
countries. For instance, long -term response of industrial production to a 1% change in the 
inflation rate is 2.63%, 1.13%, 1.37%, 2.63% and 4.26% in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, 
Egypt, and Tunisia respectively. Among the sample countries, Tunisia's industrial production 
is the most sensitive to inflation rate fluctuations. The lending interest rate is found to be 
significantly negatively associated with output of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Egypt. A 
1% increase in rates depresses the long-run industrial production of UAE, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt and Kuwait by -3.19%, -2.53%, -1.53% and -1.50% respectively.  
15 
 
The long- and short-term asymmetry tests are included in Table 7.  The table shows that 
there is substantial asymmetry in the response of MENA output to the oil prices in the short 
and long term. This result is significant and uniform across all countries. The only exception 
is the response of Tunisian industrial output which seems to be symmetric, but only in the 
short run.   
The adjustment and uncertainty effects are expected to detract income growth following 
an oil price increase and to exacerbate the negative impact after oil price decreases. However, 
these theoretical guesses are not supported by the estimates that indicate more economic 
growth after an increase in energy prices.  
A potential explanation of this lies in the behavior of Governments in the oil exporter 
countries of the MENA region. These countries have public budgets that are balanced at 
relatively low prices of oil. For instance, Kuwait’s budget is balanced when the barrel of oil is 
priced at $49.1, whereas Saudi Arabia’s and UAE’s budgets are balanced when the barrel of 
oil is $83.8 and $67 respectively.28 The excess revenues due to higher oil prices flow to the 
country’s sovereign wealth funds which are mainly invested in the US and Europe.29 
However, when oil prices are low, these funds liquidate assets in order to support the current 
level of public spending. In that sense, the sovereign wealth funds play an important role in 
the stability of public spending and the economy when oil prices are low. Therefore, a drop in 
the oil price will not have its toll on the economy.30  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
However, following increases in the oil price, additional resources will be transferred from 
oil importer countries to oil exporter countries. These revenues support higher levels of 
public spending, investments, output, and growth. The higher oil price will also induce more 
                                                          
28 Source: Fitch, High Mark Capital, Capital, IWF, WSJ.  
29
 These funds are owned by the government. Their timehorizon is multigenerational and their objective is to 
grow and to pass the benefits of oil revenues through to future generations.   
30
 Note that domestic oil prices are controlled and hence, the adjustment effect in minor. 
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public and private investments in the oil and the gas sectors due to the now higher expected 
returns. As domestic oil prices are not changing, there will be hardly any sectoral allocation 
adjustments in either labor, capital or even investm nt as a response to the increase in global 
oil prices.31 Moreover, the high prices of oil will reduce uncertainty regarding the future of 
government revenues, spending, economic growth, and jobs. This, in turn, stimulates more 
private investment and spending. Therefore, increases in oil prices strongly influence output 
expansion in MENA countries.32  
As mentioned previously, an important feature of the non-linear ARDL model is the 
possibility to observe the adjustment paths of the real industrial production due to positive 
and negative shocks in the real oil price. The adjustment paths capture the dynamics of the 
real industrial production as it moves from its initial equilibrium to the new one following a 
shock to the oil price. Figure 3 depicts how the cumulative dynamic multipliers of output are 
changing across time following positive and negative oil shocks. 
The figure contains three lines and a band. The gren and red lines shows adjustment to 
positive and negative shocks respectively. The blue middle line is the line that shows 
asymmetry and it offsets the impact on the equilibrium of similar positive and negative 
shocks. The location of the line should be around zero if the real output responds 
symmetrically to changes in the oil prices. Finally, the cloud band is the 90% confidence 
interval which is generated by bootstrapping the sample positive and negative cumulative 
sums of the real oil prices, and then estimating the dynamic multiplier and offsetting it at 
various horizons.     
                                                          
31
 The only potential adjustment is the reallocation of resources into the energy sector as it is now more 
profitable due to higher oil prices.  
32 Note that in the literature, there is a strong evid nce that falls in oil prices are unlikely to initiate an expansion, 
while rises are likely to trigger recessions. See Kilian and Vigfusson (2011), Kilian (2008), Hamilton (2009), 
Edelstein and Kilian (2009) among many others.   
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 In Figure 3, the positive (negative) oil price shock has a positive (negative) impact on the 
output of oil exporters and Egypt, but a negative impact only on Tunisia.  Moreover, Figure 3 
clearly shows that the influence of increases in the oil price on the industrial output is higher 
than the influence of oil price decreases. The blueline and its confidence interval are always 
above zero and for all countries. The degree of asymmetry is similar across oil exporters but 
it is slight for Egypt. In Tunisia, there is a slight asymmetry in the opposite direction. 
Figure 3 also shows that the adjustment to a drop in the oil price in the oil exporter 
countries takes a longer time than the adjustment in oil importers: around 60 months, 40 
months, and 20 months are needed for the industrial output to reach its new equilibrium in 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE respectively. However, equilibrium is attained within 
one year in Egypt and Tunisia.  
The slow adjustments may indicate that oil exporters are rich and own large financial 
reserves that are tapped when necessary in order to support and stabilize their economies in 
the face oil price decreases. The poor economies of Egypt and Tunisia have little resources 
and then absorb shocks quickly by reducing their industrial outputs. 
The upshot here is that output is more stable and its adjustments are slower in the oil 
exporter countries of the MENA region. Moreover, the output increases at a slower pace 
when oil prices increase, but it drops at a relatively faster rate when oil prices decrease.   
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
 
6.  Robustness analysis  
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To check if results stands another specification, we estimate the VAR model of Kilian and 
Vigfusson (2011a, b) which is a structural model that uses 12 monthly lags:33 
 = p + ∑ p,3:3 3 + 			 ∑ p,3:3 3 + 7,																																															(9)                                 
 = p +  p,3
:
3
3 + 			  p,3
:
3




 + 7,				(10) 
where 
 is the maximum real price of oil in the previous 12 months i.e., 
 =
max	(
, 0); 7, and 7,	are serially uncorrelated disturbances with zero mean. Asymmetry 
is investigated by testing the null  r:	,3 = ,3 = 0	for	all	; using a Wald test that is 
asymptotically distributed as w:.   
Table 8 displays the slope-based test results using 12 lags. The Wald test rejects the null 
above at the 0.01% significance level in all countries. Thus, we conclude asymmetry under 
this model as well.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
To see if the paths of the response of the real output to oil price changes are symmetric, we 
use a test statistic that is based on 10,000 bootstrap imulations of impulse response functions 
of Equations 9 and 10. The null hypothesis is written as  
r ∶ yQ(ℎ, 2) = −yQ(ℎ, −2) 
where the yQ  is the impulse responses of output to oil shocks 2 that are functions of the 
horizon ℎ. Under the null, a Wald test statistics has an asymptotic distribution of  w:(r + 1). 
Table 9 reports the p-values of the test of symmetry from two months to one year. The test 
is conducted for one and two standard error ={ shocks in the oil price. The table shows that 
responses are asymmetric particularly for large shocks. This result is significant and uniform 
                                                          
33
 In the literature, there is no guide to the number of lags that are adequate to capture the dynamics in the oil-
output VAR relationship. However, many studies have gone back one year (Hamilton and Herrera, 2004; 
Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez, 2005; Herrera et al.2011; Herrera et al. 2015; Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011a, 
b).     
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across all countries. However, when the shock size i  r latively small, the null of symmetry is 
only rejected for short horizons. Over longer horizns that extends beyond 8 months, 
responses in output to positive and negative one standard error shocks in oil are likely to be 
equivalent. The exception is Saudi Arabia which shows pronounced asymmetry for shocks of 
various magnitude in the oil price and over all horiz ns.     
The graphical representation of impulse-responses for various positive shock sizes is 
displayed in Figure 4.   
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 
7. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this research, we provide recent evidence on the asymmetric influence of oil price 
changes on the industrial output of six MENA countries. The results that we obtain are 
interesting and intuitive. First, we find that growth in MENA countries is linked to oil in the 
sense that it benefits from higher oil prices and it gets hurt by a fall in the oil market. 
Moreover, there is pronounced short- and long-term asymmetries in the influence of oil on 
output. In particular, the output is faster to respond to increases in oil prices than to decreases. 
The long-term influence to a rise in the oil price s also higher although it is realized over a 
longer period.  
The findings in this paper are important for politicians and policy makers in the MENA 
region. First, the danger to economic growth and employment in the MENA region lies when 
the oil price falls. The first shock will hit public revenues and then it spreads across the 
economy. Therefore, these countries should set up policies that hedge against drops in the oil 
market in order to moderate its effects on the domestic conomy. For instance, governments 
in the MENA region may buy insurance against oil price falls when it is expected. Similarly, 
businesses should adopt a risk management strategy against energy price fluctuations. 
20 
 
Furthermore, attempts to engage in long term contracts to supply oil when prices are 
relatively high may also help stabilize the MENA economies. 
The idea of diversifying government revenues away from oil seems to be crucial. This can 
be done by diversifying the economy itself and by restructuring the whole of the tax regime 
in order to fit for that purpose.  
The establishment of sovereign wealth funds is an intell gent idea that can be also used to 
promote a stable macroeconomic environment against volatile energy markets. Therefore, 
these funds should be encouraged and mandated to support the economy against oil price 
volatility. These funds should target allocations that are weakly correlated with energy 
markets.    
In the oil importer countries of the MENA region, hedging the fluctuation of oil prices and 
increasing dependence on clean energy sources is paramount to protect government budgets 
and to stabilize and grow the economies.  
Appendix A 
[INSERT TABLE A1 HERE] 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of level variables 
 Mean Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Real industrial production (IP)      
Egypt 10.993 0.084 1.304 3.365 26.015*** 
Tunisia 9.343 0.036 0.111 2.800 0.470 
UAE 10.809 0.043 -0.301 2.198 4.442 
Saudi Arabia 11.102 0.038 0.632 2.814 8.093** 
Kuwait 9.399 0.039 -0.502 2.214 5.957* 
Qatar 9.964 0.043 -0.688 2.301 9.333*** 
Real oil prices (OP)      
Egypt 3.012 0.153 -1.088 2.999 18.171*** 
Tunisia 2.197 0.121 -0.666 2.643 10.231*** 
UAE 2.470 0.165 -0.384 1.915 9.292*** 
Saudi Arabia 2.488 0.166 -0.456 2.320 7.495** 
Kuwait 1.357 0.151 -0.624 1.982 11.673*** 
Qatar 2.466 0.160 -0.922 2.498 14.307*** 
Real inflation rate (INF)      
Egypt 0.010 0.011 0.653 4.326 13.272*** 
Tunisia 0.004 0.003 0.083 2.887 0.217 
UAE 0.002 0.004 1.623 10.206 327.943*** 
Saudi Arabia 0.003 0.005 3.116 20.379 1974.129*** 
Kuwait 0.002 0.003 1.042 4.142 25.401*** 
Qatar 0.001 0.004 -0.529 4.914 22.530*** 
Real interest rate (R)      
Egypt 0.079 0.032 1.475 4.098 38.003*** 
Tunisia 0.042 0.006 -0.221 3.577 2.840 
UAE 0.047 0.006 0.063 3.772 3.213 
Saudi Arabia 0.007 0.014 1.778 6.233 133.731*** 
Kuwait 0.046 0.005 0.241 3.624 2.801 
Qatar 0.053 0.012 0.918 3.036 15.890*** 
Note: The values in parentheses are p-values. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
















Table 2: Unit root tests with constant and linear trend, t-stat. (ADF, automatic lag length, max = 12) 
 Level First Difference Second Difference 
Real industrial production (IP)       
Egypt -2.763 (0.214) -8.538** (0.000)   
Tunisia -4.908*** (0.000) -4.491*** (0.002)   
UAE -2.885 (0.171) -18.151*** (0.000)   
Saudi Arabia -2.505 (0.325) -2.786 (0.205) -8.198*** (0.000) 
Kuwait -1.695 (0.744) -2.291 (0.433) -4.835*** (0.01) 
Qatar 1.926 (0.999) -3.367** (0.015)   
Real oil prices (OP)       
Egypt -1.989 (0.598) -6.851*** (0.000)   
Tunisia -2.583 (0.288) -8.370*** (0.000)   
UAE -2.549 (0.304) -7.424*** (0.000)   
Saudi Arabia -3.098 (0.110) -8.000*** (0.000)   
Kuwait -2.134 (0.520) -7.875*** (0.000)   
Qatar -3.242* (0.081) -8.481*** (0.000)   
Real inflation rate (INF)       
Egypt -7.061*** (0.000) -7.762*** (0.000)   
Tunisia -3.551** (0.038) -11.536***  (0.000)   
UAE -8.291*** (0.000) -7.937*** (0.000)   
Saudi Arabia -10.773*** (0.000) -9.723*** (0.000)   
Kuwait -5.759*** (0.000) -7.113*** (0.000)   
Qatar -8.647*** (0.000) -9.944*** (0.000)   
Real interest rate (R)       
Egypt -2.791 (0.204) -11.904*** (0.000)   
Tunisia -1.967 (0.613) -4.094*** (0.008)   
UAE -6.343*** (0.000) -7.459*** (0.000)   
Saudi Arabia -3.654** (0.029) -14.001*** (0.000)   
Kuwait -2.362 (0.396) -5.758*** (0.000)   
Qatar -1.665 (0.760) -12.985*** (0.000)   
Notes: H0: ln(variable) has a unit root. Critical vlues are -4.063, -3.460, and 3.156 for 1%, 5% and 10% level. The values in parentheses 
are p-values. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 





Table 3: Lee-Strazicich two-break unit-root test  
 T-statistic Selected lag Time break 1 Time break 2 DU1 DU2 DT1 DT2 
Egypt        
Level        
IP -4.570 5 2012:10 2013:7 -0.200 (-2.275) 0.082 (0.877) -0.200 (5.660) -0.145* (-1.729) 
OP -5.749* 8 2010:10 2012:10 -0.097*** (-5.345) 0.138*** (5.988) 0.036 (0.886) -0.060* (-1.339) 
INF -6.845** 2 2015:4 2017:7 -0.020*** (-5.419) -0.009** (-2.546) 0.022** (2.225) -0.011 (-1.149) 
R -6.190* 8 2015:7 2017:3 0.000 (0.071) 0.027*** (3.993) 0.018 (1.590) -0.015 (-1.244) 
First Difference        
∆IP -12.929*** 7 2012:10 2013:5 -0.271*** (-4.944) 0.295*** (4.011) 0.564*** (7.366) -0.141*** (-3.763) 
∆OP -7.144*** 2 2011:2 2013:4 0.058*** (4.522) 0.011 (0.819) -0.128** (-2.786) -0.097** (-2.164) 
∆INF -9.842*** 1 2013:8 2017:5 0.017*** (5.464) -0.053*** (-8.101) -0.025** (-2.091) 0.076*** (5.808) 
∆R -10.331*** 1 2013:3 2016:11 -0.034*** (-8.060) 0.062*** (9.122) 0.059*** (4.656) -0.068***  (-5.339) 
Tunisia        
Level        
IP -4.409 6 2010:1 2015:12 -0.029 (-1.812) 0.032 (1. 95) 0.063** (2.957) -0.034* (-1.703) 
OP -5.317* 2 2008:6 2014:1 0.019** (2.071) -0.055*** (-4.380) -0.010 (-0.298) -0.050 (-1.427) 
INF -6.575*** 6 2010:10 2014:7 -0.005***  (-5.267) 0.007*** (6.193) 0.008*** (3.206) -0.011*** (-4.030) 
R -4.850 6 2012:8 2015:10 0.003** (3.437) -0.007*** (-4.164) -0.006* (1.691) 0.010** (2.715) 
First Difference        
∆IP -9.212*** 11 2008:11 2014:9 0.091*** (9.017) -0.100*** (-9.586) -0.120*** (-5.541) 0.109*** (5.236) 
∆OP -7.545*** 2 2008:1 2014:3 -0.072*** (-4.697) 0.049*** (5.432) 0.250*** (7.301) -0.090** (-2.437) 
∆INF -11.916*** 4 2014:11 2015:6 -0.005*** (-4.442) 0.011*** (7.423) 0.006** (2.143) -0.005 (-1.919) 
∆R -8.441*** 5 2013:8 2015:9 0.007*** (6.103) -0.023*** (-8.544) -0.014** (-3.751) 0.028*** (6.451) 
UAE         
Level        
IP -5.336* 5 2008:8 2012:5 0.002 (0.467) -0.015*** (-3.201) 0.015 (0.748) 0.056** (2.642) 
OP -5.505* 2 2008:3 2013:10 0.038*** (3.637) -0.062*** (-4.760) -0.007 (-0.198) -0.049* (-1.414) 
INF -7.586*** 5 2009:1 2015:9 0.008*** (4.989) -0.005*** (-5.176) -0.015*** (-3.675) -0.001 (0.358) 
R -5.981** 7 2011:3 2016:10 -0.004*** (-4.127) 0.010*** (5.608) -0.001 (-0.258) -0.015*** (-3.609) 
First Difference        
∆IP -11.047*** 1 2007:12 2009:10 -0.120*** (-8.829) 0.037*** (5.888) 0.155*** (6.462) -0.004 (-0.182) 
∆OP -7.388*** 5 2008:1 2015:6 0.104*** (5.348) 0.023** (2.579) -0.116** (-2.790) 0.022 (0.611) 
∆INF -9.798*** 7 2015:5 2016:4 -0.017*** (8.705) 0.034*** (9.946) 0.023*** (4.581) -0.038*** (-6.772) 
∆R -10.050*** 5 2015:11 2016:8 -0.025*** (-9.080) 0.027*** (8.772) 0.032*** (5.777) -0.035*** (-6.496) 





Table 3: (continued) 
 T-statistic Selected lag Time break 1 Time break 2 DU1 DU2 DT1 DT2 
Saudi Arabia        
Level         
IP -4.866 5 2010:1 2012:9 0.022** (2.552) -0.033** (-3.112) -0.065* (-1.940) 0.028 (1.021) 
OP -5.378* 2 2014:10 2015:8 -0.046*** (-3.845) 0.029** (2.358) 0.009 (0.262) 0.061* (1.781) 
INF -9.791*** 1 2008:1 2009:6 0.001 (0.566) 0.000 (0.178) -0.003 (-0.702) 0.005 (1.098) 
R -5.789** 5 2008:1 2009:4 -0.014*** (-4.299) -0.008** (-3.400) 0.008 (1.404) 0.007 (1.363) 
First Difference        
∆IP -9.035*** 9 2012:12 2015:1 0.063*** (7.915) -0.128*** (-8.820) -0.100*** (-4.991) 0.184*** (8.176) 
∆OP -8.091*** 2 2008:7 2009:2 -0.126*** (-5.182) 0.055*** (3.281) 0.086** (2.191) -0.075** (-2.137) 
∆INF -14.025*** 1 2008:2 2010:5 0.012*** (5.682) -0.016*** (-9.526) -0.014** (-2.323) 0.022*** (3.774) 
∆R -13.632*** 1 2010:6 2014:8 -0.019** (-9.931) 0.013*** (8.538) 0.024*** (3.967) -0.012** (-1.996) 
Kuwait        
Level        
IP -4.588 8 2008:6 2010:11 0.027*** (3.944) -0.030*** (-4.448) -0.046*** (-3.125) 0.037** (2.255) 
OP -4.990 2 2012:3 2013:10 -0.119*** (-4.027) 0.054** (2.456) 0.048 (1.438) -0.008 (-0.305) 
INF -8.219*** 7 2010:7 2016:5 0.004*** (3.898) -0.012*** (-7.933) -0.011*** (-4.122) 0.017*** (5.751) 
R -5.458 7 2011:1 2013:4 0.004*** (3.252) 0.006*** (4.873) 0.002 (0.617) -0.013*** (-4.510) 
First Difference        
∆IP -9.507*** 11 2009:4 2010:10 0.056*** (9.170) -0.078*** (-10.251) -0.114*** (-8.699) 0.087*** (5.856) 
∆OP -8.067*** 2 2012:6 2013:5 -0.073*** (-5.287) 0.01 *** (2.936) 0.128*** (3.488) -0.016** (-2.548) 
∆INF -12.636*** 7 2012:5 2016:7 -0.028*** (-11.511) 0.017*** (8.518) 0.033*** (8.841) -0.009** (-2.644) 
∆R -11.448*** 7 2012:10 2013:12 0.021*** (10.197) -0.0 4*** (-3.052) -0.029*** (7.920) -0.002 (-0.587) 
Qatar        
Level        
IP -6.970 5 2011:11 2015:1 -0.0126*** (-3.163) 0.0201*** (4.065) 0.011 (0.743) -0.071***  (-4.295) 
OP -4.002 1 2014:12 2015:9 -0.048** (-2.951) -0.015 (-1.087) -0.079** (-2.224) 0.006 (0.191) 
INF -9.744*** 2 2009:11 2010:2 0.001 (0.632) -0.009*** (-3.106) -0.004 (-0.827) 0.006* (1.703) 
R -5.458 2 2010:11 2017:5 -0.007*** (-4.411) 0.014*** (5.276) 0.004 (1.008) -0.018*** (-3.825) 
First Difference        
∆IP -11.027*** 5 2010:8 2015:1 -0.163*** (-8.893) -0.074*** (-6.511) 0.052** (2.447) 0.255*** (10.668) 
∆OP -8.569*** 2 2009:12 2010:7 -0.055 (-3.037) 0.021 (1.516) 0.055 (1.468) -0.015 (-0.428) 
∆INF -13.351*** 1 2010:5 2016:4 -0.014*** (-8.546) -0.012*** (-8.841) 0.017*** (3.766) 0.020*** (4.517) 
∆R -13.918*** 1 2010:9 2011:7 0.014*** (6.491) 0.017*** (8.314) -0.015*** (-3.111) -0.026*** (-5.514) 
Notes: H0: ln (Variable) has a unit root. Critical v lues are -5.847, -5.332, and -5.064 for 1%, 5% and 10% level. The number of lags was set at maximum 12. The values in parentheses are t-
statistics. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 




Table 4: Diks–Panchenko Granger causality test 
  	 ≠>   ≠>  
Country Test Statistic  Test Statistic  
Egypt 1.749** (0.040) 1.119 (0.131) 
Tunisia 2.322** (0.037) 0.642 (0.260) 
UAE 2.602** (0.024) 1.194 (0.116) 
Saudi Arabia 3.312** (0.014) 1.251 (0.105) 
Kuwait 2.467** (0.032) 1.170 (0.120) 
Qatar 2.154 (0.015) 0.994 (0.160) 
Note: The symbol “≠>” implies no Granger-causality. The optimal Embedding dimension = 2. The series are in 
first differences. The Panchenko’s C++ code is used to get the test statistics and the p-values.  Numbers in 
brackets are the associated p-values. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
 
 
Table 5: Hatemi-J asymmetric Granger causality test 
 Hypothesis Wald Test Statistic Bootstrap Critical V ues 
   1% 5% 10% 
Egypt 
 ≠> 
 2.073* 12.743 4.052 2.015 
  ≠>  6.043** 13.845 2.597 1.154 
 
 ≠>  1.276 7.065 2.702 1.698 
  ≠> 
 1.034 8.741 3.329 1.942 
Tunisia 
 ≠> 
 2.633 7.408 3.937 2.704 
  ≠>  1.998 5.924 3.599 2.448 
 
 ≠>  4.039** 6.502 3.782 2.647 
  ≠> 
 7.346*** 7.204 3.654 2.710 
UAE 
 ≠> 
 4.376** 6.765 4.041 2.918 
  ≠>  6.622*** 6.438 3.921 2.655 
 
 ≠>  1.067 6.912 4.069 2.569 
  ≠> 
 1.887 7.321 4.451 3.097 
Saudi Arabia 
 ≠> 
 6.507*** 6.425 3.947 2.658 
  ≠>  8.669*** 7.534 4.053 2.839 
 
 ≠>  3.591** 6.234 3.476 2.541 
  ≠> 
 1.608 6.935 3.622 2.672 
Kuwait 
 ≠> 
	 9.531*** 7.377 3.887 2.612 
  ≠> 	 7.089*** 6.913 3.091 2.213 
 
 ≠> 	 0.166 7.118 3.807 2.867 
  ≠> 
	 3.860* 7.191 4.111 2.998 
Qatar 
 ≠> 
 7.330*** 6.765 3.562 2.661 
  ≠>  8.098*** 7.536 4.365 2.975 
 
 ≠>  1.330 6.765 3.562 2.661 
  ≠> 
 0.470 8.503 4.178 2.702 
Note: The vectors (
 ,	
 ) and  ( ,	) are the cumulative positive and negative shocks respectively. 
 ≠>  indicates that real oil prices do not cause real industrial production. The max lag length set at 4 and
the optimal one is selected based on minimizing the information criterion suggested by Hatemi-J (2003). We 
estimate the table using Hatemi-J’s (2012) GAUSS code f r asymmetric causality.  
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
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Table 6: NARDL estimation results for pass-through of oil prices (OP) to industrial production (IP) 
 Egypt Tunisia UAE Saudi Arabia Kuwait  Qatar 
 -0.684*** (0.000) -0.311** (0.042) -0.311*** (0.008) -0.264*** (0.003) -0.173** (0.034) -0.708*** (0.00) 

  0.273** (0.022) -0.015* (0.081) 0.132*** (0.003) 0.121*** (0.002) 0.056*** (0.008) 0.0619 (0.432) 
  -0.100* (0.066) 0.035 (0.312) -0.076*** (0.009) -0.064** (0.033) -0.075** (0.030) -0.010*** (0.002) 
 1.288** (0.025) 1.089** (0.040) -2.412* (0.061) 1.288** (0.025) 1.468* (0.072) 0.009 (0.991) 
 -0.781*** (0.004) -0.172* (0.071) -2.384*** (0.009) -0.781*** (0.004) -0.317* (0.061) -0.584* (0.068) 
∆ -0.055 (0.665) -0.1422 (0.373) -0.487 *** (0.001) -0.152*** (0.000) -0.173** (0.034) -0.228** (0.027) 
∆}         -0.330*** (0.008)   
∆~   -0.313*** (0.010) -0.298*** (0.000)       
∆       0.199** (0.050)     
∆           -0.364*** (0.000) 
∆ 0.071** (0.047)   -0.384*** (0.000)   -0.411*** (0. 01)   
∆
 0.341** (0.048) -0.079** (0.049) 0.391*** (0.004) 0.803*** (0.001) 0.187** (0.011) 0.075* (0.054) 
∆
  0.309* (0.054)     0.132** (0.030) 0.111** (0.033) 0.135** (0.018) 
∆}
    -0.094** (0.041)   0.299* (0.069)     
∆ -0.135** (0.043) 0.003* (0.096) -0.093** (0.040) -0.0623** (0.023) -0.133*** (0.005) -0.088** (0.032) 
∆            -0.078** (0.040) 
∆  -0.044* (0.067) 0.177* (0.097) -0.0232 (0.082) -0.130*** (0.001) -0.083*** (0.002)   
∆ 2.627*** (0.000) 4.258** (0.015) 1.369* (0.054) 2.627*** (0.000) .130  1 * 0.  ( 072) -0.212 (0.790) 
∆ -1.526*** (0.001) 2.548 (0.115) -3.189*** (0.004) -2.526*** (0.001) - .496  1 *** 0.  ( 009) 1.081 (0.408) 
Constant 7.677*** (0.000) 2.890** (0.043) 2.894*** (0.011) 4.067*** (0.000) 1.611** (0.034) 3.329*** (0.007) 
*QN 0.399** (0.024) -0.383** (0.017) 0.425*** (0.000) 0.398*** (0.002) 0.323*** (0.007) 0.008 (0.810) 
*QP -0.147** (0.013) 0.089 (0.385) -0.245*** (0.000) -0.213** (0.040) -0.147** (0.046) -0.102*** (0.000) 
 0.84  0.61  0.637  0.739  0.876  0.808  
  0.69  0.43  0.511  0.562  0.658  0.647  
wR  29.89 (0.790) 37.05 (0.603) 38.43 (0.541) 21.42 (0.98 ) 41.80 (0.233) 51.33* (0.089) 
w  0.21 (0.642) 0.23 (0.627) 0.521 (0.470) 2.714 (0.299) 1.269 (0.252) 0.549 (0.599) 
w  2.27 (0.103) 1.12 (0.347) 0.653 (0.583) 1.17 (0.509) 1.231 (0.308) 1.735 (0.180) 
TUVW -4.209  -3.787  -4.783  -5. 784  -2.159  -4.840  
QRR 4.074  3.632  11.260  8.587  2.164  7.944  
Note: This table reports the estimation results of the best-suited NARDL specifications for the pairs comprised of oil prices and industrial production. *QN and *QP are long-run coefficients associated with positive 
and negative changes of oil prices, respectively. TUVW is the Banerjee et al. (1998) t-statistic while QRR denotes the Pesaran et al. (2001) F-statistic for bounds test respectively. Following Shin et al. (2014), the preferred 
model is chosen by starting with max p = max q = 12 and then dropping all insignificant  regressors. The 5% critical values of TUVWt are -3.53 and -3.22 for k = 2 and k = 1, respectiv ly, while the equivalent values for 
QRR are 4.85 and 5.73. Numbers in brackets are the associ ted p-values. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
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Table 7: Results of short- and long-run symmetry tests in multivariate setting 
Country   R 
Egypt 11.59*** (0.001) 6.83** (0.012) 
Tunisia 11.65*** (0.001) 0.044 (0.835) 
UAE 75.67*** (0.000) 11.98*** (0.001) 
Saudi Arabia 32.33*** (0.000) 16.92*** (0.000) 
Kuwait 8.695** (0.005) 3.913* (0.074) 
Qatar 57.24*** (0.000) 2.0435 (0.102) 
Notes: The table reports the results of the short- and long-run symmetry tests for the effect of oil pr ces on the 
industrial production. R denotes the Wald test for the short-run symmetry, while	 corresponds to the Wald 
test for long-run symmetry. Numbers in brackets are the associated p-values. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 





Table 8: Wald Test for asymmetries  
Country  w: p-values 
Egypt 217.579*** (0.000) 
Tunisia 157.662*** (0.000) 
UAE 626.820*** (0.000) 
Saudi Arabia 1455.985*** (0.000) 
Kuwait 224.238*** (0.000) 
Qatar 928.574*** (0.000) 
Notes: this table report the Wald test and its p-values with the null hypothesis of joint significant, that is ,3 = ,3 =
0	for	all	;.  
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 





Table 9: Testing the symmetry of the response,  ∶ (, ) = −(, −) for  =, , , … ,  
 Egypt Tunisia UAE Saudi Arabia Kuwait Qatar 
ℎ ={ 2={ ={ 2={ ={ 2={ ={ 2={ ={ 2={ ={ 2={ 
0 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.946 0.935 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.016** 0.008*** 0.381 0.502 0.399 0.497 
2 0.009*** 0.000*** 0.091* 0.033** 0.027** 0.001*** 0.062* 0.034** 0.018** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
4 0.030** 0.001*** 0.281 0.066* 0.082* 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.027** 0.061* 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.000*** 
8 0.079* 0.001*** 0.582 0.020** 0.148 0.000*** 0.03** 0.095* 0.085* 0.000*** 0.033** 0.001*** 
10 0.145 0.003*** 0.740 0.023** 0.288 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.018** 0.278 0.001*** 0.052* 0.000*** 
12 0.178 0.004*** 0.788 0.027** 0.532 0.003*** 0.100* 0.023** 0.339 0.001*** 0.074* 0.000*** 
Notes: The table shows the p-vales of testing the symmetric impulse responses of industrial production o positive and negative shocks in	real	oil	price	of one standard deviation shocks, δ=σ ̂  
and two standard deviation shocks, δ=2σ ̂). p−values are based on the w
 . The estimated impulse response functions computed using 10,000 bootstrap simulations. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
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Table A1: Unit root tests for asymmetric components 
  ADF with constant and linear trend Lee-Strazicich two-break unit-root test 
  Level First Difference Level First Difference 
Real industrial production (IP) 
Egypt 
 -1.866 (0.663) -10.447*** (0.000) -7.011*** -17.167*** 
  -4.031** (0.010) -10.995*** (0.000) -5.059 -9.203*** 
Tunisia 
 -1.057 (0.931) -14.083*** (0.000) -6.062** -14.020*** 
  -1.310 (0.880) -12.542*** (0.000) -5.633** -9.616*** 
UAE 
 0.526 (0.999) -14.687*** (0.000) -6.722*** -9.310** 
  0.200 (0.997) -14.310*** (0.000) -4.789 -11.067*** 
Saudi Arabia 
 -1.724 (0.734) -9.594*** (0.000) -6.028*** -10.040*** 
  -1.606 (0.785) -10.698*** (0.000) -3.844 -8.375*** 
Kuwait 
 -1.447 (0.840) -9.656*** (0.000) -6.220** -7.954*** 
  0.458 (0.999) -13.909*** (0.000) -4.753 -7.936*** 
Qatar 
 -3.019 (0.132) -8.545*** (0.000) -4.028 -8.620*** 
  -1.625 (0.776) -13.316*** (0.000) -4.075 -7.622*** 
Real oil prices (OP) 
Egypt 
 -1.259 (0.891) -7.890*** (0.000) -5.947* -9.012*** 
  -1.889 (0.651) -6.465*** (0.000) -5.543 -7.343*** 
Tunisia 
 -1.897 (0.649) -10.792*** (0.000) -4.651 -8.184*** 
  -2.448 (0.353) -6.911*** (0.000) -4.665 -8.284*** 
UAE 
 -2.190 (0.490) -10.189*** (0.000) -4.670 -8.754*** 
  -2.496 (0.329) -6.328*** (0.000) -4.854 -7.625*** 
Saudi Arabia 
 -2.039 (0.574) -10.705*** (0.000) -4.998 -8.158*** 
  -2.452 (0.351) -6.821*** (0.000) -4.531 -7.859*** 
Kuwait 
 -1.202 (0.904) -10.107*** (0.000) -5.470 -8.226*** 
  -1.908 (0.643) -6.709*** (0.000) -6.794** -8.508*** 
Qatar 
 -3.037 (0.126) -10.061*** (0.000) -4.025 -7.626*** 
  -1.992 (0.599) -7.173*** (0.000) -6.416*** -8.855** 
Notes: The TDICPS software developed by Hatemi-J and Mustafa (2016) was used to transform the data into cumulative partial sums for positive and negative components. H0: ln (variable) has a unit root. Theoptimal 
lags for ADF test were selected by Schwarz information criterion with a max lag length set at 12. Critical values are -4.063, -3.460, and 3.156 for 1%, 5 and 10% level. The values in parentheses are p-values. Critical 
values Lee-Strazicich test are -5.847, -5.332, and -5.064 for 1%, 5% and 10% level. The number of lagswa  set at maximum 12. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 















































Notes: These graphs give cumulative effects of positive and negative oil shocks on industrial production. Shade areas are 
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Notes: Each plot illustrates impulse responses based on the non-linear methodology by Kilian and Vigfusson (2011a, b). 
 















































































• Asymmetry effects of oil price changes on output in six MENA countries. 
• There are short- and long-term asymmetries in the influence of oil on output. 
• The output is faster to respond to increases in the oil price than it responds to decreases. 
• Adopt a risk management strategy against energy price fluctuations. 
• Diversify government revenue away from oil. 
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